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INTRODUCTION

State-level legislation focused on the transgender1 community has
exploded over the last several years.2 Proposed laws mandating the
exclusion of transgender individuals from specific sectors of society
have been increasingly focused on trans children and youth.3 In 2021,
legislatures in thirty-one states introduced bills that would prohibit
transgender student-athletes from taking part in school sports in a
manner consistent with their gender identities.4 Eight of those states
1. “Transgender” or “trans” is used to describe a person whose gender identity is not
the same as the sex they were assigned a birth. Linell Smith, Glossary of Transgender Terms, JOHN HOPKINS MED. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.hopkinsmed
icine.org/news/articles/glossary-of-terms-1 [https://perma.cc/35GE-2PXB]. This
word is often described as an “umbrella term,” meaning it is a broad label used to
reference a group of related yet distinctive concepts. See Umbrella, OXFORD
LEARNER’S DICTIONARY (2021); Umbrella Term Law and Legal Definition, U.S.
LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/umbrella-term/ [https://perma.cc/BZ85J58F] (last visited May 29, 2021). “Transgender” encompasses a range of gender
identities, including individuals whose gender identity or expression does not fit
within the binary classifications of man or woman. See GLAAD, MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE (11th ed. 2022), https://www.glaad.org/reference/trans-terms [https://
perma.cc/FXL9-T5S2]. It is crucial to note that the transgender community is not
a monolith; in general, determinations regarding the language used to describe a
trans person should be determined by that individual alone. See id.
2. Jo Yurcaba, “State of Crisis”: Advocates Warn of “Unprecedented” Wave of AntiLGBTQ Bills, NBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2021, 1:48 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/state-crisis-advocates-warn-unprecedented-wave-anti-lgbtq-billsn1265132 [https://perma.cc/N9FA-FLH5].
3. Priya Krishnakumar, This Record-Breaking Year for Anti-Transgender Legislation Would Affect Minors the Most, CNN (Apr. 15, 2021, 9:46 AM), https://
www.cnn.com/2021/04/15/politics/anti-transgender-legislation-2021/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K88V-Y5R3].
4. Id. Bills regulating transgender students’ participation in sports were introduced
during 2021 in Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, New
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ultimately passed laws barring young women who are trans from participating in girls’ and women’s sports programs sponsored by federally-funded schools.5 Idaho enacted a bill that blocked transgender
women and girls from competing in sex-segregated athletics in 2020.6
Additionally, during the first several months of 2022, three additional
states have passed legislation regulating transgender youth’s participation in sports, bringing the total number of states with such laws to
twelve.7
Opponents of transgender inclusion in sports allege that allowing
trans girls and women to participate in girls’ and women’s sports will
harm their cisgender8 peers.9 Arguments about these alleged harms
primarily center on the concept of fair play in women’s sports.10 Legis-

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id.; Legislation Affecting LGBT
Rights Across the Country, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/legislation-affecting-lgbtrights-across-country [https://perma.cc/R3E5-VVHY] (last visited Oct. 5, 2021) .
Dan Avery, Texas Bill Banning Transgender Students in School Sports Heads to
Governor’s Desk, NBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2021, 6:10 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
nbc-out/out-politics-and-policy/texas-bill-banning-transgender-students-schoolsports-heads-governors-rcna3203 [https://perma.cc/A4YL-3AKA]. Florida, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee, West Virginia, Montana, Alabama, and Texas all
passed laws during 2021 regulating transgender student-athletes’ participation
in sports. Id. Such a bill also passed in Louisiana, but Governor John Bel Edwards vetoed it, stating the “bill was a solution in search of a problem.” Melinda
DeSlatte, Louisiana Governor Vetoes Transgender Sports Ban Proposal, ASSOC.
PRESS (June 22, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/louisiana-government-andpolitics-02bfec3097bcbb857c656557a1718632 [https://perma.cc/Y9CE-KKAB].
South Dakota’s governor also vetoed a bill barring transgender girls and women from participating in women’s sports. Devan Cole, South Dakota’s Governor
Issues Executive Orders Banning Transgender Athletes from Women’s Sports,
CNN (Mar. 31, 2021, 3:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/30/politics/southdakota-transgender-sports-kristi-noem/index.html [https://perma.cc/NHW7AK3Z]. However, after facing intense backlash, she issued two executive orders
prohibiting “transgender girls and women from competing on women’s sports
teams at public high schools and colleges.” Id.
See IDAHO CODE §§ 33-6201 to -6206 (2020).
Utah Bans Transgender Athletes in Girls Sports Despite Governor’s Veto, NPR
(Mar. 25, 2022, 5:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/2022/03/25/1088908741/utah-trans
gender-athletes-veto-override [https://perma.cc/6W4T-N6MK]. In 2022, Iowa,
South Dakota, and Utah all passed laws prohibiting transgender students from
participating in athletics in a manner consistent with their gender identity. See
MOVEMENT ADVANCE. PROJECT, LGBTQ YOUTH: BANS ON TRANSGENDER YOUTH
PARTICIPATION IN SPORTS 2, 5 (2022), https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-sports-participation-bans.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CRM-DPF3].
“Cisgender” or “cis” refers to individuals whose gender identity is consistent with
their sex assigned at birth; that is, people who are not transgender. GLAAD,
supra note 1.
See subsection III.B.1 for an examination the alleged justifications for bills regulating transgender girls and women’s participation in sports.
In fact, many bills passed by state legislatures limiting transgender students’
participation in athletics include the word “fairness” in the title. See, e.g., Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, H.B. 500, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020) (codi-
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lators introducing such bills claim that transgender athletes will displace cisgender athletes without wholesale bans on transgender
women’s participation.11
This Comment will examine transgender girls’ and women’s access
to sex-segregated sports under Title IX. Part II will provide an overview of relevant law, including Title IX, Title VII, and the Equal Protection Clause. Part III will analyze state laws regulating transgender
students’ participation in sex-segregated sports. Section A will apply
the Equal Protection Clause, scrutinizing the dividing line between
permissible distinctions based on “real” physiological differences and
impermissible distinctions based on gender stereotypes and the
means-ends fit between the recent bans and stated policy aims. Section B will analyze and apply Title IX’s plain language and purpose,
ultimately concluding that transgender women and girls must be allowed to participate in athletics in a manner consistent with their gender identity.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Overview of Title IX and its Application to Athletics

Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 to ensure equity “in educational
settings, including in admissions and programming, and in benefits
and treatment.”12 Title IX states that federally-funded schools may
not exclude students from participating in academic and extracurricular opportunities or treat them differently “on the basis of sex.”13 However, the term “sex”14 is not defined by Title IX or by related
regulations enacted by the Department of Education.15

11.

12.
13.
14.

15.

fied as IDAHO CODE §§ 33-6201 to -6206 (2021); Mississippi Fairness Act, S.B.
2536, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2021) (codified as MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-97-1 to -5
(2021)).
See infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. Ironically, many of the bills
passed to solve this alleged problem also apply to transgender children who have
not yet gone through puberty, and regulate athletics of all kinds, including intramural sports. See subsection III.B.2 for an in-depth analysis of such laws’ meansends fit.
Doriane Lambelet Coleman et al., Re-Affirming the Value of the Sports Exception
to Title IX’s General Non-Discrimination Rule, 27 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 69
(2020).
20 U.S.C. § 1681.
Generally, the term “sex” means an individual’s categorization as male or female.
GLAAD, supra note 1. Sex is used within this Comment with the understanding
that it is a normative term for something that is, in reality, a complex and
nuanced constellation of physical characteristics, including “chromosomes, hormones, internal and external reproductive organs, and secondary sex characteristics.” Id.
Dylan O. Malagrinò, May They Play: Soule v. Connecticut Association of Schools,
Inc., Title IX, and a Policy of Inclusion for High School Transgender Athletes
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Title IX’s statutory and regulatory framework employs a “hybrid”
strategy.16 Scholars have noted that Title IX itself establishes “a sexblind non-discrimination rule,” whereas the regulations guiding its
implementation contain narrow “sex-affirmative exceptions.”17 The
regulations governing athletics under Title IX (the Athletic Regulations) first set a baseline that any exclusion or discriminatory treatment based on sex is impermissible.18 The Athletic Regulations then
provide two exceptions to this general rule. First, separate teams are
allowed in “contact sports,” defined as those where physical contact is
necessarily involved.19 Second, separate teams are permissible where
players will be selected based on ability; however, teams must permit
members of the other sex to try out if “opportunities for members of
that sex have previously been limited.”20 The Athletic Regulations
also require schools to ensure gender parity in the athletic opportunities they offer.21
1.

Title IX’s Enactment

Initially, whether Title IX would apply to athletics was an open
question. Congress did not include a committee report with the final
bill, and the congressional record is largely devoid of discussions regarding the Act’s applicability to sports.22 However, congressional action in the years immediately following Title IX’s passage clarified
that it was to cover school athletic programs with full force.23
In 1974, Senator John Tower introduced a bill to amend Title IX to
exclude sports that produced revenue for schools from the Act’s equality mandate.24 Senators rejected this amendment in favor of an alter-

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

Without Prerequiring Hormone Therapy or Puberty Blockers, 31 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 35, 68 (2020).
Coleman et al., supra note 12, at 69.
Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2020).
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2020).
Id. § 106.41(b).
Id.
Id. § 106.41(c). This overall approach has been described as “permissive” because
schools are free to pursue approaches that do not account for sex, so long as they
do not result in disparities. See Coleman, supra note 12, at 82.
There were “only two mentions of intercollegiate athletics during the congressional debate,” both from Senator Birch Bayh, one regarding potential privacy
concerns in “athletic facilities,” and another assuring the body that sex-segregated football teams would still be permitted under the Act. Cohen v. Brown
Univ. (Cohen I), 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (first citing 118 CONG. REC.
5,807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh about privacy); and then citing 117 CONG.
REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh regarding football teams)).
See, e.g., Jocelyn Samuels & Kristen Galles, In Defense of Title IX: Why Current
Policies Are Required to Ensure Equality of Opportunity, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 11, 19–20 (2003).
S. 2106, 94th Cong. (1975); see Samuels & Galles, supra note 23, at 19–20.
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native bill introduced by Senator Jacob Javits.25 The Javits
Amendment instructed the U.S. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) to promulgate regulations governing Title IX’s implementation in a host of areas, including “intercollegiate athletic activities.”26 As many scholars have observed, this made abundantly
clear Congress intended Title IX to apply to athletics programs at federally-funded schools.27
As instructed, HEW issued proposed regulations in 1974, which received nearly 10,000 comments—most of which concerned athletics.28
The finalized regulations were published in 1975.29 Under federal law
at the time, Congress had the opportunity to review and comment
before regulations took effect and could reject regulations—either in
whole or in part—through a joint resolution.30 Congress held extensive hearings on the regulations, during which representatives
presented nine different resolutions and bills aimed at narrowing or
eliminating Title IX’s application to sports.31 Title IX’s proponents in
25. See Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat.
484 (1974).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Samuels & Galles, supra note 23, at 19–20.
28. Id. at 20 n.44.
29. Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen I), 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Ellen
J. Staurowsky, Title IX and College Sport: The Long Painful Path to Compliance
and Reform, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 101 (2003) (discussing the notice and
comment period for HEW’s Title IX regulations in 1974, and “the intensity of the
reaction” the regulations caused).
30. See Samuels & Galles, supra note 23, at 20. Section 431(d)(1) of the General Education Provisions Act allowed Congress to review a regulation before its implementation to ensure it was not “inconsistent with the Act from which it derive[d]
its authority.” N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 531–32 (1982). Congress then had forty-five days to pass a concurrent resolution disapproving of a
regulation, thereby overriding it. Id.
31. Between the House and Senate, six resolutions were introduced. See S. Con. Res.
46, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 17300–01 (1975) (introduced by Sen. Helms) (providing that the regulations governing athletics were inconsistent with Title IX);
S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 22940 (1975) (introduced by Sen.
Laxalt) (declaring that requiring proportionality in athletics scholarships between men and women under the regulations amounted to an impermissible
quota system); H. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 19209 (1975) (introduced by Rep. Martin); H. Con. Res. 311, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 19209
(1975) (introduced by Rep. Martin); H. Con. Res. 329, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC.
21687 (1975) (introduced by Rep. O’Hara); H. Con. Res. 330, 94th Cong., 121
CONG. REC. 21687 (1975) (introduced by Rep. O’Hara). Additionally, multiple bills
were introduced to amend Title IX. See S. 2106, 94th Cong. (1975) (introduced by
Sen. Tower) (excluding athletic programs that provide revenue from Title IX); S.
2146, 94th Cong. (1975) (introduced by Sen. Helms) (prohibiting Title IX from
being applied to athletics); H.R. 8394, 94th Cong. (1975) (introduced by Rep.
O’Hara) (allowing schools to put any money brought in by revenue-producing
sports back into only those sports); H.R. 8395, 94th Cong. (1975) (introduced by
Rep. O’Hara) (also providing that schools may re-invest money brought in by revenue-producing sports into those sports, regardless of the institution’s overall
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Congress fought to ensure the Act would require equity in athletics,
emphasizing the need to ensure women and girls were not denied access to “the educational opportunities that have been the assumed
right of their brothers.”32 During these hearings, “Congress expressly
considered arguments that requiring equal opportunity in athletics
would impose quotas, result in reverse discrimination against men, or
conflict with” the plain text of Title IX.33 Ultimately, Congress rejected attempts to water down or eliminate Title IX’s application to
athletics and instead implemented the Athletic Regulations.34
2.

Opposition to Title IX, and Congressional and Agency
Responses

Title IX’s history shows its application to sports have repeatedly
made similar arguments, to which Congress has repeatedly responded
by reaffirming—and even strengthening—the statutory scheme.35 Opponents have frequently expressed consternation about Title IX’s potential negative impact on the resources and opportunities allocated to
young men.36 Before the Athletic Regulations’ finalization in 1975, the
head of the NCAA wrote to President Gerald Ford, exclaiming that, if

32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

gender parity). All the aforementioned resolutions and bills ultimately failed. See
Samuels & Galles, supra note 23, at 22.
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on PostSecondary Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong. 166 (1975) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
Samuels & Galles, supra note 23, at 22.
See id.
See, e.g., Samuels & Galles, supra note 23, at 24 (“[T]he history of Title IX demonstrates that the same arguments have repeatedly been made to challenge Title
IX’s application to athletics and that Congress has understood, adopted, and reaffirmed the statute, its regulations, and its athletics policies each and every time
they have faced attack.”).
See Coleman et al., supra note 12, at 72–73; Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty:
An Introduction and Historical Review of Forty Legal Developments that Shaped
Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 348–50 (2012). For example,
in Kelly v. Board or Trustees, cisgender male student-athletes challenged the
University of Illinois’ decision to cut its men’s, but not its women’s, varsity swimming team, arguing that if Title IX required such a result, it should also “require
the university to eliminate women from the academic departments where they
are over[-]represented.” Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning that “Congress itself recognized
that addressing discrimination in athletics presented a unique set of problems.”
Id. at 270. The Court also upheld the Athletic Regulations, including the proportionality test established in the agency’s 1979 Policy Interpretation. Id. at
271–72; see Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11,
1979).
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approved, the regulations “could seriously damage if not destroy the
major men’s intercollegiate athletic programs.”37
Congress has taken affirmative action to ensure the continued application of Title IX to athletic programs. In Grove City College, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that private institutions’ receipt of federal
funds in student financial aid did not require them to comply with
Title IX throughout all their programs and activities.38 This ruling
significantly limited the scope of Title IX, with a marked impact on
collegiate-level sports—unless athletic programs directly benefitted
from federal funds, Title IX’s equity mandate would not apply.39 Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 in direct response to the Court’s decision.40 The Civil Rights Restoration Act
clarified that the definition of “program or activity” under Title IX demanded institution-wide coverage.41 Thus, one program’s acceptance
of federal funds required all programs and activities within that
school comply with Title IX.42 Congressional debate on the Act emphasized Title IX’s equity requirement in the context of sports, stating
that it was necessary to remedy past discrimination against women in
athletics.43
The legality of Title IX and the Athletic Regulations has been litigated extensively, and courts have repeatedly rejected arguments that
the regulations transformed Title IX “from a statute which prohibits
37. Staurowsky, supra note 29, at 102. Additionally, the NCAA—which only included
men’s collegiate sports at the time—filed suit in 1976, disputing the legality of
Title IX’s application to athletics. See id. at 102 n.38; History of Title IX, WOMEN’S
SPORTS FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/advocacy/history-of-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/5WGJ-SMBB]. The suit was ultimately
dismissed in 1978; however, the NCAA continued to fight, even offering up the
Association’s own legal counsel to assist Grove City College in its landmark suit
challenging the scope of Title IX. See WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND, supra; Staurowsky, supra note 29, at 104.
38. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1984).
39. WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., supra note 37; see also Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 51, 58 (1996) (observing that
following the Court’s decision in Grove City, the Office of Civil Rights “immediately dropped or narrowed almost forty pending Title IX athletics
investigations”).
40. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1987).
Stating in the Act’s opening paragraph that its purpose was to “restore” Title IX’s
“broad scope of coverage,”; see also Margaret E. Juliano, Forty Years of Title IX:
History and New Applications, 14 DEL. L. REV. 83, 86 (“The Civil Rights Restoration Act was specifically targeted to overcome the Grove City decision.”).
41. See Civil Rights Restoration Act § 3(a) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687).
42. Id.
43. See Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen I), 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing
statements of multiple Senators during debate to support the premise that the
Civil Rights Restoration Act “was aimed, in part, at creating a more level playing
field for female athletes”); Samuels & Galles, supra note 23, at 23.
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discrimination on the basis of sex into a statute that mandates discrimination against males” by establishing a “gender-based quota system.”44 In rejecting challenges to Title IX, courts have found that
Congress intended Title IX to require institutions to actively work “to
remedy discrimination that results from stereotyped notions of women’s interests and abilities.” 45
B.

Title VII’s Relevance and the Significance of Bostock

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment-related discrimination against individuals based on “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”46 Title IX’s legislative history demonstrates
that its drafters drew inspiration from the Civil Rights Act,47 and
courts have consistently looked to cases that construed Title VII when
interpreting Title IX.48 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has examined
Title VII when applying Title IX on multiple occasions.49
44. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 270–71 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1128 (1995). Courts have also repeatedly upheld the 1979 HEW policy interpretation, which applied specifically to intercollegiate sports and set up three options
by which covered institutions could show they were complying with Title IX’s
requirements. See Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71413 (Dec.
11, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 26); see also Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 906–07 (affirming a preliminary injunction and rejecting the school’s assertion that it was
in compliance with first prong of the three-part test if it provided athletic opportunities to young women “in direct proportion to [their] comparative levels of interest”); Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen II), 101 F.3d 155, 173 (1st Cir. 1996)
(upholding the three-part test and asserting that agency interpretations regarding Title IX policy are entitled to deference); Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 773
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “Title IX does not bar universities from taking steps
to ensure that women are approximately as well represented in sports programs
as they are in student bodies” under the three-part test).
45. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
47. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 586 (1984) (“Title IX was patterned
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”); Anderson, supra note 36, at 326.
During Title IX’s initial introduction in 1971, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana
stated that “educational opportunity should not be based on sex,” just as Congress had barred schools from discriminating based on race and national origin
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 117 CONG. REC. 30406–07 (1971).
48. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 616 n.1 (1999); Grimm v.
Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (Aug.
28, 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-1163, 2021 WL 2637992 (U.S. 2021); Adams ex rel.
Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020);
Emeldi v. Univ. of Or., 698 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 2012); Jennings v. Univ. of
N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp.,
128 F.3d 1014, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997).
49. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175–77 (2005) (comparing Title IX to Title VII in determining whether a claim of retaliation in response to reporting sex discrimination was cognizable under Title IX); Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1998) (examining the aims of
both Acts in determining the scope of monetary damages for sexual harassment
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Bostock and “Because of . . . Sex”

The U.S. Supreme Court decided Bostock v. Clayton County in
2020. At issue was whether discrimination “because of . . . sex” under
Title VII applied to differential treatment based on an individual’s
sexual orientation or gender identity.50 The Court answered this question affirmatively, holding that it was impossible to discriminate
against someone for their LGBTQ+51 status without discriminating on
the basis of sex.52 The majority found Title VII’s text required this
result because sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination
necessarily meant treating the same acts differently based on the actor’s sex assigned at birth.53 Thus, Title VII’s plain language—“because of . . . sex”—inherently prohibits discrimination against the
LGBTQ+ community.
In early 2021, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice published a memorandum (DOJ Memo) advising that the Supreme Court’s holding in Bostock should be applied when interpreting
Title IX.54 The memorandum relied on two primary arguments. First,
the Division asserted that both statutes’ plain language prohibiting
gender discrimination was interchangeable.55 Next, it noted that both
Title VII and Title IX apply to instances of individual gender discrimination.56 The Division also emphasized that there was “nothing persuasive in the statutory text, legislative history, or case law to justify

50.
51.

52.
53.

54.

55.
56.

under Title IX); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524–27 (1982) (comparing Title IX to Title VII in determining that Title IX extends to employment
discrimination).
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020).
“LGBTQ+” is an acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer. Kendra Cherry, What Does LGBTQ+ Mean?, VERYWELL MIND (Nov. 30, 2020), https://
www.verywellmind.com/what-does-lgbtq-mean-5069804 [https://perma.cc/4C5HWCLZ]. The plus sign at the end represents additional identities that are not
directly represented by the letters “LGBTQ.” Id.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
Id. at 1742. A person’s sex assigned at birth is the label “male” or “female” assigned to that individual when they were born “based on anatomical and physiological markers.” Tim Newman, Sex and Gender: What is the Difference?, MED.
NEWS TODAY (May 11, 2021), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/232363
[https://perma.cc/8AP7-BWWL]. This is distinct from a person’s gender identity,
which a someone’s “internal, deeply held sense of their gender.” GLAAD, supra
note 1.
See generally Memorandum from Pamela S. Karlan, Principal Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Civ. Rts. Div. to Fed. Agency Civ. Rts. Dirs. & Gen.
Couns. on the Application of Bostock v. Clayton County to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/
1383026/download [https://perma.cc/45UJ-CSB5].
Id. at 2 (observing that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because
of . . . sex” was functionally equivalent to Title XI’s prohibition on discrimination
“on the basis of sex”).
Id.
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a departure from Bostock’s textual analysis and the Supreme Court’s
longstanding directive to interpret Title IX’s text broadly.”57
Further solidifying Bostock’s likely application to Title IX, the U.S.
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (DOE) issued a Notice of Interpretation (the Notice) in June 2021, recognizing that Title
IX prohibits discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation.58 The DOE also relied on the textual similarities of the two
Acts, including that neither creates an exception to the broad prohibition on sex discrimination for treatment based on gender identity or
sexual orientation.59 Additionally, the DOE argued that interpreting
Title IX to protect LGBTQ+ students is harmonious with Title IX’s
purpose of shielding students from the injuries caused by gender discrimination and assuring equitable access to educational programs
and activities.60 The Notice contained no specific references to athletics.61 However, it asserted that the DOE would investigate and, when
appropriate, act on reported Title IX violations grounded in differential treatment based on gender identity.62
Thus, there is substantial support for the premise that the Supreme Court’s approach to construing Title VII in Bostock must inform future interpretations of Title IX.
C.

The Equal Protection Clause

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying people within their “jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”63 This provision is “essentially a direction that
all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”64
The presence of state action is a threshold requirement for demonstrating an equal protection violation.65 State action exists when the
person or entity carrying out the challenged activity does so under the
actual or apparent authority of the government and on its behalf in
some capacity.66 However, private parties can engage in state action
57. Id. at 3.
58. See Enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 with Respect
to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Light of
Bostock v. Clayton County, 86 Fed. Reg. 32637 (June 22, 2021).
59. Id. at 36638.
60. Id. at 36639.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
65. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181–82 (1988).
66. Id. at 191. Although the text of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state
governmental entities, its equality mandate also applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (asserting that
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where “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the [s]tate and the
challenged action,” such that the act or omission can reasonably be
ascribed to the government.67 It is well established that public schools
and universities are state actors subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment.68
The first step in Equal Protection analysis is determining the appropriate level of scrutiny.69 Different standards of review apply
based on whether the law in question affects members of a suspect or
quasi-suspect class or impedes fundamental constitutional rights.70
Four factors inform whether a group should be categorized as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.71 The first consideration is “whether the
class has historically been subject to discrimination.”72 The next factor is whether “the class has a defining characteristic that bears a relation to its ability to perform or contribute to society.”73 The final
considerations are whether the class can be characterized as discrete
based on “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics,” and
whether the class lacks political power.74
If the community targeted by a law is not a suspect or quasi-suspect group, or if the law does not infringe on a fundamental right,

67.
68.

69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from engaging in discrimination); see also Dan T. Coenen, Quiet-Revolution
Rulings in Constitutional Law, 99 BOS. U. L. REV. 2061, 2077–83 (2019) (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court’s “reverse-incorporation” decisions developed to
standardize the approach to Equal Protection challenges between the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments).
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298
(2001) (holding that an association of Tennessee high schools consisting of eightyfour percent public schools was a state actor); Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 183 (noting
that the University of Nevada was “a state-funded institution” whose administrators “unquestionably act[ed] under color of state law”).
See Vittoria L. Buzzelli, Comment, Transforming Transgender Rights in Schools:
Protection from Discrimination Under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause,
121 PENN ST. L. REV. 187, 196 (2016).
See City of Celburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (holding that
heightened scrutiny was appropriate “when a statute classifies by race,” gender,
nationality, or immigration status, or when “state laws impinge on personal
rights protected by the Constitution”); Buzzelli, supra note 69, at 197 (noting that
discrimination based on gender falls within the “quasi-suspect class” category
and is reviewed under intermediate scrutiny). Although the Fourteenth Amendment passed following reconstruction to eliminate discrimination based on race,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it prohibits other forms of discrimination,
including discrimination based on gender. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Textualism
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237, 1275 (2017).
Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 611 (4th Cir.) (as amended on
August 28, 2020), reh’g en banc denied, 976 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 2878 (2021) (mem.).
Id. (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)).
Id. (citing Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440–41).
Id. (citing Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602).
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courts will apply rational basis review.75 This extremely deferential
standard merely requires the state to demonstrate the law is based on
a legitimate governmental interest to which the means used are rationally related.76 When applying rational basis review, courts generally will not inquire into whether the interest cited by the government
is pretextual so long as it reasonably could “have been a goal of the
legislation.”77
1.

Intermediate Scrutiny and Gender Discrimination

Government actions based on gender are subject to intermediate
scrutiny.78 Intermediate scrutiny requires that a state actor show “exceedingly persuasive justification” that a challenged gender classification promotes “important governmental objectives,” and that the
classification is “substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.”79 Further, the proffered grounds “must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc,” and cannot hinge “on overbroad
generalizations about . . . different talents, capacities, or preferences”
based on gender.80
Stereotypes and “archaic and overbroad generalizations” about the
sexes cannot underlie a valid government interest under the Equal
Protection Clause.81 Laws struck down for this reason are often
grounded in gendered familial and caretaking expectations82 or outdated ideas regarding the abilities and interests of women and men.83
75. Buzzelli, supra note 69, at 196–97.
76. Sarah Halbach, Comment, Framing a Narrative of Discrimination Under the
Eighth Amendment in the Context of Transgender Prisoner Health Care, 105 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINALITY 463, 470–71 (2015) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
631 (1996)).
77. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981) (quoting
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)) (“In equal protection
analysis, this Court will assume that the objectives articulated by the legislature
are actual purposes of the statute, unless an examination of the circumstances
forces us to conclude that they ‘could not have been a goal of the legislation.’ ”).
78. Buzzelli, supra note 69, at 197.
79. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 533 (emphasis omitted).
81. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
82. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382, 394 (1979) (striking down a
New York law that allowed unmarried mothers, but not unmarried fathers, to
stop their child from being adopted by withholding consent); Weinberger, 420 U.S.
at 651–53 (striking down a portion of the Social Security Act that provided for
payment of insurance benefits to widows with children, but not widowers).
83. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540, 557–58 (rejecting the Virginia Military Institute’s arguments that limiting admissions to men only was necessary because
most women were not suited to the adversarial method of education, and could
not meet the physical standards required of cadets); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
200–02, 210 (1976) (finding the state’s assertion that young women were less
likely to drink and drive did not justify an Oklahoma law that allowed women to
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Provisions that make pronounced distinctions based on gender and require divergent treatment for similarly situated men and women
solely to achieve administrative convenience are also presumptively
invalid.84 However, correcting for past societal discrimination against
women is generally seen as a valid governmental interest.85 Finally,
laws that differentiate based on “real” physiological differences between men and women are sometimes upheld.86 Thus, there are essentially two tracks for equal protection claims alleging gender
discrimination. Courts may uphold gender-based distinctions intended to help counteract the harmful effects of past discrimination or
those grounded in meaningful physiological differences.87 Conversely,

84.

85.

86.

87.

purchase 3.2% beer at age eighteen, but did not allow men to purchase it until
age twenty-one).
See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1700–01 (2017) (striking
down a provision that required unmarried mothers who were U.S. citizens to
show one year of “continuous physical presence” in the United States in order to
pass their citizenship to their child born abroad with a non-U.S.-citizen father,
but required unmarried fathers in the same situation to demonstrate five years);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (striking down an Idaho statute that
required a man to be selected over a woman when both were equally qualified
candidates to administer an estate).
For example, in Kelly v. Board of Trustees, the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection challenge following the elimination of the University of
Illinois’ men’s, but not its women’s, swimming team. Kelly v. Bd. Of Trs., 35 F.3d
265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[R]emoving the legacy of sexual discrimination—including discrimination in the provision of extra-curricular offerings such as athletics—from our nation’s educational institutions is an important governmental
objective.”). See also Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 508–09 (upholding a law that
treated female naval officers more leniently than male naval officers because the
statutory scheme was not based on gender stereotypes but, rather, the reality
that the two groups were “not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for
professional service”); Clark ex rel. Clark v. Ariz. Interschol. Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126,
1131–32 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding a policy prohibiting young men from playing
on a women’s high school volleyball team because “redressing past discrimination
against women in athletics and promoting equality of athletic opportunity between the sexes” was a valid governmental interest).
See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (“Mechanistic classification of all our differences as stereotypes would operate to obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real.”); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445
(1998) (“The biological differences between single men and single women provide
a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on
children born in foreign lands.”); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981)
(holding that women’s exclusion from the draft did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it merely required the government to “treat similarly situated persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures of superficial equality”);
Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 471–73 (1981) (upholding a criminal law
prohibiting statutory rape that applied only to male perpetrators because the
state legislature was not unreasonable in finding that nearly all serious harms of
teen pregnancy fell upon young women, and, thus, the law essentially equalized
the disincentives placed upon men and young women).
See supra notes 85–86.
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courts will strike down laws that burden men or women based on
mere gender stereotypes.88
Lower federal courts have increasingly held that discrimination
against transgender individuals warrants intermediate scrutiny
under two distinct modes of analysis. Some circuits have determined
that discrimination against trans individuals is grounded in impermissible gender stereotypes, placing such suits within existing gender
discrimination equal protection jurisprudence.89 Other circuits have
held that the transgender community is a quasi-suspect class and,
therefore, laws aimed at transgender individuals must receive heightened scrutiny.90 Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court does not expand the
categories of suspect or quasi-suspect classes frequently and has not
yet held that the transgender community constitutes such a class.91
Ultimately, the Supreme Court may draw on the reasoning used in
Bostock when analyzing discrimination against the transgender community under the Equal Protection Clause.92 Applying Bostock’s reasoning would allow the Court to strike down discrimination against
the transgender community without creating or meaningfully ex88. See supra notes 81–84.
89. See, e.g., Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of
Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018)
(mem.), abrogated by Ill. Repub. Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2020);
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem,
378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
90. See supra, notes 70–74 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 607 (4th Cir.) (as amended on August 28, 2020),
reh’g en banc denied, 976 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2878
(2021) (mem.).
91. See Halbach, supra note 76, at 472–73 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has
not added a group to the list of suspect or quasi-suspect classes “since adding
nonmarital parentage in 1977”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
HARV. L. REV. 747, 757–58 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court has, in essence, closed the “heightened scrutiny canon,” and, therefore, no new groups will
be added to the suspect or quasi-suspect categories).
92. Many scholars have argued that the Bostock majority’s textualist reasoning will
influence conceptions of gender discrimination in future Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Michael Milov-Cordoba & Ali Stack, Note, Transgender
and Gender-Nonconforming Voting Rights After Bostock, 24 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 323, 339–40 (2021) (noting that lower courts have started applying the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bostock to Equal Protection claims brought by
transgender plaintiffs); Ho, infra note 93, at 367–68 (observing that courts will
likely look to Bostock’s reasoning when assessing the level of scrutiny that should
apply to Equal Protection suits challenging discrimination based on LGBTQ+
status); Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The Future of LGBTQ Civil Rights,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
lgbtq-rights/reports/2020/08/26/489772/beyond-bostock-future-lgbtq-civil-rights/
[https://perma.cc/QE38-U7VV] (“An extension of the Supreme Court’s finding in
Bostock that sex necessarily includes sexual orientation and gender identity
could also mean, then, that laws that target people based on sexual orientation or
gender identity could be subject to heightened scrutiny.”).
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panding any protected categories by holding that discrimination based
on transgender status necessarily involves discrimination based on
someone’s sex assigned at birth.93
2.

Animus Review and Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation

Although it remains uncertain whether applying intermediate
scrutiny to discrimination based on gender identity will become the
prevailing doctrinal approach, past U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding LGBTQ+ rights have seemingly applied a more rigorous version of rational basis review.94 Scholars refer to this approach as
“rational basis with bite.”95
Under this standard, state action is unconstitutional when it creates “arbitrary or irrational” distinctions between classes of people out
of “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”96 For
example, the Supreme Court found that a law grounded solely on animus toward same-sex couples lacked a legitimate governmental interest.97 In so holding, the Court stated: “A law declaring that in general
it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to
seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of
the laws in the most literal sense.”98
93. See infra notes 173–79 and accompanying text. How the Court interprets discrimination within a federal statute does not govern future applications of constitutional prohibitions on unequal treatment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238–39 (1976) (reversing the circuit court’s opinion, finding that it erroneously
applied the broader manner in which racial discrimination is defined under Title
VII to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). However, in
reality, the boundary between the Supreme Court’s constitutional and statutory
anti-discrimination jurisprudence is often somewhat fluid. See Cheryl I. Harris,
Limiting Equality: The Divergence and Convergence of Title VII and Equal Protection, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 98 (“[N]otwithstanding the prevailing view that
Title VII and equal protection standards for establishing discrimination and assessing remedies are distinct, there is a good deal of transference between
them.”); Jeremiah A. Ho, Queering Bostock, 29 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
283, 368 (2021) (“[T]he jurisprudential boundaries between Title VII sex discrimination cases and constitutional sex equality cases are often porous.”).
94. See Halbach, supra note 76, at 471 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (noting that courts have used “a more searching form of rational basis review” when reviewing laws that plainly discriminate
against the LGBTQ+ community under the Equal Protection Clause).
95. Id. (citing Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L.
REV. 923, 928 (2010)).
96. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (quoting
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, (1973)).
97. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a Colorado constitutional
amendment allowing discrimination based on sexual orientation “classifie[d]
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else”).
98. Id. at 633.
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Decisions Applying Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause to Transgender Students

Every circuit court of appeals to consider whether Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause protect the rights of transgender students
has, thus far, answered affirmatively. There are two primary categories of cases that circuit courts have decided: those brought by transgender students opposing school policies barring them from using
facilities corresponding with their gender identity and those brought
by cisgender students challenging trans-inclusive school policies.
1.

Cases Brought by Transgender Students

The Fourth,99 Sixth,100 Seventh,101 and Eleventh102 Circuits have
decided cases in favor of transgender students who challenged discriminatory school policies. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board
is the most high-profile case construing the rights of transgender students under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.103 Grimm filed
suit against his local school board, challenging its policy requiring students to use only bathrooms corresponding with their “biological gender.”104 In considering Grimm’s Equal Protection challenge to the
policy, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that height99. See infra notes 103–108 and accompanying text.
100. In the Sixth Circuit, a school district appealed a preliminary injunction ordering
the school to allow a transgender girl to use the girls’ bathroom. Dodds v. U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 220 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit denied the
school district’s motion to stay the injunction, finding that the “public interest
weight[ed] strongly” against the stay because the injunction protected the transgender student’s “constitutional and civil rights.” Id. at 222.
101. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court’s preliminary injunction, preventing a school district from implementing a policy that barred
transgender students from using bathroom facilities consistent with their gender.
See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ.,
858 F.3d 1034, 1039, 1054–55 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018)
(mem.), abrogated by Ill. Repub. Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2020).
The court also held that the student’s Equal Protection claim should be reviewed
under heightened scrutiny based on a sex-stereotyping theory. Id. at 1039.
102. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently sided with a transgender high
school student in a suit challenging his school’s bathroom policy under Title IX
and the Equal Protection Clause. See Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty. (Adams I), 3 F.4th 1299, 1320 (11th Cir.) (deciding the case in the transgender student’s favor on Equal Protection grounds and, accordingly, declining to address
the merits of the student’s Title IX claim), reh’g en banc granted, 9 F.4th 1369
(11th Cir. 2021). The decision was vacated on August 23, 2021, and the case will
be reheard en banc. Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 9 F.4th 1369, 1372. The
now-vacated decision held that heightened scrutiny should apply. Adams I, 3
F.4th at 1307.
103. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir.) (as amended on August 28, 2020), reh’g en banc denied, 976 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 2878 (2021) (mem.).
104. Id. at 593.
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ened scrutiny should apply because “the bathroom policy rests on sexbased classifications and because transgender people constitute at
least a quasi-suspect class.”105 The court held that the policy violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it was not substantially related
to the school board’s proffered goal of protecting students’ privacy, but
rather was grounded in “sheer conjecture and abstraction,” as well as
possible prejudice.106
Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Gloucester School
Board’s petition for a writ of certiorari, electing to leave the Fourth
Circuit decision in Grimm’s favor undisturbed.107 Some experts have
argued that the Supreme Court’s decision demonstrated an evolving
legal landscape for transgender rights.108
2.

Cases Brought by Cisgender Students

The Ninth and Third Circuits have upheld school policies allowing
transgender students to use bathroom facilities corresponding with
their gender identity against challenges brought by cisgender students. The Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court’s dismissal of all claims,
finding that allowing transgender students access to “bathroom and
locker facilities that match their self-identified gender in the same
manner that cisgender students utilize those facilities” did not violate
any constitutional right or amount to sexual harassment under Title
105. Id. at 607 (emphasis omitted).
106. Id. at 614 (quoting Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 400 F. Supp. 3d 444, 461
(E.D. Va. 2019) (quoting Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1052)). Additionally, the court
explicitly relied on Bostock to find that the school board’s bathroom policy and its
refusal to amend Grimm’s school records to reflect his preferred gender violated
Title IX. Id. at 616, 619.
107. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 141 S. Ct. 2878, 2878 (2021) (mem.); see also
Jessica Scheck & Jennifer Schaller, The Supreme Court’s Transgender Bathroom
Case Rebuff, What Direction Should School Districts Take?, NAT’L L. REV. (July 9,
2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-s-transgender-bathroom-case-rebuff-what-direction-should-school [https://perma.cc/9D7Z-2Z5Y]
(discussing the implications of the Court’s decision not to grant certiorari).
108. For example, experienced labor and employment attorney Shannon Farmer asserted that the Supreme Court’s decision denying certiorari in Grimm shows that
“Bostock changed the legal landscape surrounding LGBTQ+ discrimination.”
Scheck & Schaller, supra note 107 (emphasis added). Jessica Clarke, professor of
law and co-director of the George Barrett Social Justice Program at Vanderbilt
University, stated: “The decision not to grant certiorari is important because it
did not disrupt the emerging consensus among federal courts—not just the
Fourth Circuit—that schools may not forbid transgender students from using
restrooms consistent with their gender identities.” Id. But cf. Carrie Campbell
Severino, Grimm Tidings on Certiorari in Bathroom Case, NAT’L REV. (June 29,
2021, 10:06 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/grimm-tidingson-certiorari-in-bathroom-case/ [https://perma.cc/L5HA-44KB] (“A refusal to take
up this case isn’t an endorsement of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, either as a matter of legal precedent, or as a practical matter.”).
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IX.109 The Third Circuit upheld a lower court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction, finding that the case was unlikely to succeed on the merits.110 The U.S. Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petitions for certiorari in both cases.111
These holdings illustrate the current momentum toward protecting
transgender students from invidious discrimination under Title IX
and the Equal Protection Clause. It seems likely that, in general,
Courts will apply Title IX’s protections to transgender students. However, how schools must operationalize those protections in various
contexts while balancing competing interests remains unclear. Nowhere are these issues more pronounced than in athletics.
3.

Current Suits Regarding the Rights of Transgender Athletes

Transgender students and their supporters have filed suits challenging new state-level prohibitions on transgender girls’ and women’s participation in sports.112 All such suits are in the early stages
of litigation, but, thus far, federal district courts have unanimously
granted preliminary injunctive relief to transgender student-athletes.113 A grant of injunctive relief does not definitively signal the
claim’s ultimate success.114 Still, it does demonstrate that the court
found a plaintiff has made “a clear showing that she will likely succeed on the merits.”115 Regardless of their finality, these cases indicate how courts are likely to assess the validity of state laws
regulating transgender women and girls’ participation in sports.
109. Parents for Priv. v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 1239–40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 894 (2020) (mem.).
110. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019) (mem.).
111. See Parents for Priv. v. Barr, 141 S. Ct. 894 (2020) (mem.); Doe ex rel. Doe v.
Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019) (mem.).
112. The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut has considered whether a
local trans-inclusive athletic policy violated Title IX by placing cisgender women
competing in high school sports at a “competitive disadvantage” in contravention
of Title IX’s Athletic Regulations. See Soule ex rel. Stanescu v. Conn. Ass’n of
Schs., Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00201, 2021 WL 1617206, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 25, 2021).
The Court disposed of the suit on procedural grounds, and its discussion of the
merits was limited. Id.
113. See B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., No. 2:21-CV-00316, 2021 WL 3081883, at
*1 (S.D.W. Va. July 21, 2021); Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 947, 988–89
(D. Idaho), appeal filed, No. 20-35815 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2020).
114. See B.P.J., 2021 WL 3081883, at *3 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).
115. Id. To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff also must demonstrate they
are likely to be irreparably harmed if the relief is not granted, “that the balance
of equities” is in their favor, and “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id.
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ANALYSIS

As discussed above, courts have made preliminary rulings in favor
of transgender student-athletes under the Equal Protection Clause
and Title IX in cases litigating trans-exclusionary state laws.116 Consistent with these findings, this Comment argues that laws excluding
transgender girls and women from athletics cannot be justified under
the Equal Protection Clause, whether applying intermediate scrutiny
or animus review. Although laws that delineate based on gender may
be permissible, such distinctions are only viable when grounded in
“real” physiological differences, not gender stereotypes.117 Further,
there must be a reasonable means-ends fit between differential treatment based on gender, as well as a viable or important governmental
objective.118 Even assuming that states’ interest in promoting fair
play qualifies as a sufficient objective, laws barring transgender girls
and women from participating in women’s sports fail for two primary
reasons: they rely heavily on stereotyped, yet unproven notions about
athletes’ abilities based solely on their sex assigned at birth and the
laws are grossly overinclusive.
Finally, Title IX’s plain text requires prohibiting discrimination
against transgender students. This is true even of the Athletic Regulations’ exceptions to Title IX’s strict prohibition on gender-based differentiation, which ensure girls and women have meaningful access to
athletic opportunities.119 Allowing transgender women and girls to
participate in athletics in a manner consistent with their gender identity is fully in line with the spirit of Title IX.120
A.

“Real Differences” or “Overbroad Generalizations”?
Applying the Equal Protection Clause to the
Question of Transgender Inclusion in Sports

Presuming that courts apply intermediate scrutiny to state bans
on transgender girls and women’s participation in sex-segregated athletics,121 how should these cases fit within Supreme Court precedent?
The Supreme Court has recognized that laws based on “[p]hysical differences between men and women” can be valid.122 However, the
Court has been clear that physiological differences cannot be used to
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
See supra Sections II.C.1 and II.C.2.
See infra Section III.B.1.
See infra Section III.B.2.
See supra Section II.D for a discussion on the Equal Protection Clause and the
various levels of scrutiny that apply in specific instances.
122. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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place “artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity,”123 or to
draw lines that are overbroad or based upon conjecture.124 Therefore,
possible physiological differences between transgender and cisgender
girls and women are relevant but not dispositive.
Laws excluding transgender girls and women from athletics are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause because they are mainly
grounded on conjectural harms and are overbroad when narrower policies could reasonably satisfy the proffered aim of protecting cisgender
athletes’ safety and opportunities.125 Further, even if these laws were
subject to animus review, they should still be struck down because
they make an unreasonable distinction between cisgender and transgender student-athletes out of “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.”126
1.

Measuring “Real Difference”

It is a well-established part of the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence that physical differences based on sex assigned at
birth can create a valid reason for different treatment under the
law.127 However, it is rare for the Court to uphold such distinctions in
practice.128 The Court has held that “[i]nherent differences” based on
123. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
124. See id.; Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–26 (1982); Sessions v.
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692–93 (2017).
125. See infra Section III.B.1 for a discussion about the interests set forth by states
enacting such laws.
126. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (quoting
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
127. See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (upholding a law that
set different standards on mothers versus fathers for children born abroad to unmarried parents because it was based on “a biological difference between the parents”); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (“Physical differences between men and women,
however, are enduring . . . .”).
128. Compare Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550, 557–58 (emphasis omitted) (ruling that the
Virginia Military Institute may not deny admission to women, because “generalizations about the way women are, [and] estimates of what is appropriate for
most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to [all] women”), and Miss.
Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725 (“[I]f the statutory objective is to exclude or
‘protect’ members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an
inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.”),
with Tuan Anh Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445
(1998) (“The biological differences between single men and single women provide
a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on
children born in foreign lands.”), Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981)
(holding that women’s exclusion from the draft did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it merely requires the government to “treat similarly situated persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures of superficial equality”), and
Free the Nipple v. City of Springfield, 923 F.3d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding
that an ordinance that barred women from exposing their nipples, but not men,
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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gender may not be relied upon to diminish “the members of either
sex,” or to place manufactured restrictions on the opportunities available to individuals.129 Additionally, prognostications about harms
caused by gender inclusion cannot be based on conjecture or pretext.130 Courts must also “reject measures that classify unnecessarily
and overbroadly by gender when more accurate and impartial lines
can be drawn.”131
States that have passed laws regulating transgender students’ participation in athletics argue that excluding transgender girls and women is necessary to protect “opportunities for female athletes to
demonstrate their skill, strength, and athletic abilities.”132 Legislative findings point to cisgender men’s “higher natural levels of testosterone,” and how—at the onset of puberty—testosterone results in
“categorically different strength, speed, and endurance” in those assigned male at birth versus those assigned female at birth.133 However, lawmakers have frequently been unable to point to a single
129. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34.
130. Id. (first citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 648 (1975); and then
citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223–24 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
See also Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 729–30 (rejecting the State’s argument because, although it “recited a ‘benign, compensatory purpose,’ it failed to
establish that the alleged objective is the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification”).
131. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 n.13 (2017). See also J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (“Parties still may remove jurors
who they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply
may not serve as a proxy for bias.”).
132. IDAHO CODE § 33-6202(12) (2020). See also ALA. CODE § 16-1-52(a)(1) (2021)
(“Physical differences between biological males and biological females have long
made separate and sex-specific sports teams important so that female athletes
can have equal opportunities to compete in sports.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-130102(5) (2021) (quoting S. Res. 398, 115th Cong. (2018)) (“This chapter seeks to
address these lingering disparities and . . . ‘promote equality in sports and access
to athletic opportunities for girls and women.’ ”); FLA. STAT. § 1006.205(2)(b)
(2021) (“The Legislature finds that requiring the designation of separate sex-specific athletic teams or sports is necessary to maintain fairness for women’s athletic opportunities.”); W. VA. CODE § 18-2-25d(a)(3) (2020) (“Biological males
would displace females to a substantial extent if permitted to compete on teams
designated for biological females . . . .”).
133. See Doriane Coleman & Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Opinion, It’s not wrong to restrict transgender athletes. But base it on evidence, ethics, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar.
18, 2020, 1:57 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/2020/03/17/
ban-transgender-athletes-ok-but-base-evidence-ethics/5023130002/ [https://
perma.cc/LCD8-PNQY]. IDAHO CODE § 33-6202(4)–(5) (first citing Doriane
Lambelet Coleman, Sex in Sport, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 2017, at 63, 74; then
citing Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Wickliffe Shreve, Comparing Athletic Performances: The Best Elite Women to Boys and Men, DUKE L. (2018), https://
law.duke.edu/sports/sex-sport/comparative-athletic-performance/ [https://
perma.cc/9U8F-EG6U]); see also S.B. 2536, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2021) (using
nearly identical language in the Bill’s legislative findings without citing to Coleman’s work) (codified as MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-97-1 to -5 (2021)). Coleman’s re-
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instance of a transgender athlete outperforming her cisgender peers
in girls or women’s sports within their state.134 Law professor Doriane
Lambelet Coleman, whose work was explicitly referenced in many
state-level bills barring transgender girls and women from sports, has
urged lawmakers to reject such bans.135 She referred to legislation
that did not allow any “exceptions or accommodations” for transgender athletes and that required any athlete competing in the women’s category to verify their sex upon a challenge as “legally and
scientifically flawed.”136
States have also asserted that laws excluding transgender girls
and women from participating in athletics in a manner consistent
with their gender identities do not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because they are not singling out transgender student-athletes for invidious treatment.137 Those defending the laws argue that transgender girls and cisgender boys are “similarly situated” for purposes of
athletic competition because both groups were assigned male at
birth.138 This assertion willfully ignores that transgender girls and
women navigate the world as, and are, girls and women.139 Further, it
sweeps all transgender girls and women into the same category, regardless of individualized considerations140 and ignores the long-

134.

135.
136.

137.
138.
139.

140.

search was also cited within similar bills introduced in other states that were
ultimately defeated.
See B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., No. 2:21-CV-00316, 2021 WL 3081883, at
*6 (S.D. W. Va. July 21, 2021) (“Insofar as I am aware, B.P.J. is the only transgender student at her school interested in school-sponsored athletics.”); Hecox v.
Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 978–79 (D. Idaho), appeal filed, No. 20-35815 (9th
Cir. Sept. 17, 2020) (quoting IDAHO CODE § 33-6202(12)) (“[T]he legislative record
reveals no history of transgender athletes ever competing in sports in Idaho, no
evidence that Idaho female athletes have been displaced by Idaho transgender
female athletes, and no evidence to suggest a categorical bar against transgender
female athlete’s participation in sports is required in order to promote ‘sex equality’ or to ‘protect athletic opportunities for females’ in Idaho.”).
See Coleman & Hogshead-Makar, supra note 133.
Id. Coleman also asserted that recent state-level legislation was likely unlawful
because “sex discrimination is only constitutional when it’s necessary to secure
equality for females and when the means chosen to achieve that goal are not
unnecessarily broad or intrusive.” Id. To support this assertion, Coleman cited
the proposed bills’ overall failure to (1) create exceptions for transgender women
who had not gone through puberty prior to transition, and, therefore, never “developed the traits the classification[s] [were] designed to exclude”; and (2) account
for “the multiple goals of sport at different levels of play and competition.” Id.
See, e.g., B. P. J., 2021 WL 3081883, at *4.; Hecox, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 975.
B. P. J., 2021 WL 3081883, at *4.
See id. (“[Plaintiff] is similarly situated to other girls. . . . Plaintiff has lived as a
girl for years. . . . She changed her name to a name more commonly associated
with girls. And of the girls at her middle school, B.P.J. is the only girl who will be
prevented from participating in school-sponsored athletics.”).
See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 n.13 (2017) (laws must
not make categorical distinctions based on sex “when more accurate and impartial lines can be drawn”). Further, because transgender girls and young women
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standing history of discrimination against the transgender community
relative to their cisgender peers.141
2.

Bans on Transgender Girls and Women in Sports Cannot
Withstand Intermediate Scrutiny

Although an interest in preserving meaningful opportunities in
women’s sports and upholding Title IX and its regulations may constitute important governmental interests, recent state laws regulating
transgender students’ participation in sports cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny.142 These laws fail because states cannot demonstrate that a wholesale ban on transgender girls and women
competing in a manner consistent with their gender identities is “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”143 The
means-ends fit between these bills’ alleged goals and chosen methods
is dramatically inefficient, indicating that the proffered governmental
interests are not genuine.144
First, data regarding transgender women’s physiological advantage in athletics is—at best—emergent and unclear. Indidviduals assigned male at birth benefit from a competitive advantage because of
physiological differences beginning at puberty.145 Researchers have
found that transgender women likely retain a slight competitive advantage even following one year of treatment with gender-affirming
hormones.146 However, another study found that transgender women

141.

142.

143.
144.

145.
146.

make up such a small percentage of the population, delineating policy more narrowly would not be overly burdensome or difficult.
See Hecox, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 976–77 (citing Clark by & through Clark v. Ariz.
Interschol. Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 1982)) (finding that transgender women are not similarly situated to the cisgender male plaintiffs challenging their exclusion from a women’s team in Clark, in part, because
transgender women are a historically marginalized group).
See B. P. J., 2021 WL 3081883, at *4 (quoting Hecox, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 975)
(“[W]hile the physiological differences the Defendants suggest support the categorical bar on transgender women’s participation in women’s sports may justify
the Act, they do not overcome the inescapable conclusion that the Act discriminates on the basis of transgender status.”).
See id.
See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) (“[T]he mere recitation of
a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects
against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.”);
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729–30 (finding that the State’s
proffered “benign, compensatory purpose” of counteracting past discrimination
against women was not genuine where the means-end fit between that alleged
interest and the policy of excluding all men from attending the University’s nursing school was overbroad and reified stereotypical gendered assumptions).
Coleman, supra note 12, at 92 (citing The Role of Testosterone in Athletic Performance, Duke Ctr. for Sports L. & Pol’y (2019)).
See Timothy A. Roberts et al., Effect of Gender Affirming Hormones on Athletic
Performance in Transwomen and Transmen: Implications for Sporting Organisations and Legislators, 55 BRITISH J. SPORTS MED. 577, 580 (2021) (finding that

2022]

PLAY LIKE A GIRL

307

who have undergone “gender-affirming interventions”147 compete at
proportionally the same level in women’s sports as they did in men’s
sports before transitioning.148
Second, state-level laws limiting transgender girls’ and women’s
participation in sports are grossly overinclusive. Multiple states have
enacted laws that apply to student-athletes for whom the arguments
regarding testosterone and competitive advantage are wholly irrelevant. For example, statutes prohibiting transgender boys and men
who were assigned female at birth from competing in men’s athletics149 or those covering children participating in sports who have not
transwomen who had undergone one year of treatment with testosterone-suppressing medication still retained a mean run speed that was nine percent faster
than their cisgender peers); Anna Wiik et al., Muscle Strength, Size, and Composition following 12 Months of Gender-affirming Treatment in Transgender Individuals, 105 J. CLINICAL METABOLISM 805, 818–20 (2020) (finding that after one
year of treatment with testosterone-suppressing medication, transgender women’s overall muscle mass and strength decreased only modestly, but stating
that “it is still uncertain how the findings would translate to transgender athletes”). But cf. NCAA OFF. INCLUSION, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT-ATHLETES 7 (2011) (“Transgender women display a great deal of physical
variation, just as there is a great deal of natural variation in physical size and
ability among non-transgender women and men . . . the assumption that all malebodied people are taller, stronger, and more highly skilled in a sport than all
female-bodied people is not accurate.”).
147. Wiik et al., supra note 146, at 805–06 (defining “gender-affirming interventions”
of the study as the “inhibition of endogenous sex hormones and replacement with
cross-sex hormones”). Both the treatments and the purposes of gender-affirming
hormone therapy vary based on factors such as an individual’s age. See Wylie C
Hembree et al., Endocrine Treatment of Gender-Dysphoric/Gender-Incongruent
Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline, 102 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRIN. & METABOLISM 3869, 3869–70 (2017). For a transgender adult, the primary goals of hormone therapy are “reduc[ing] endogenous sex hormone levels,”
which minimizes secondary sex characteristics associated with their sex assigned
at birth and replacing those hormone levels to match their gender identity. Id. at
3885–86. In adolescents, sometimes medical intervention is appropriate to suppress puberty through puberty-suppressing medication. Id. at 3880–81.
148. Joanna Harper, Race Times for Transgender Athletes, 6 J. SPORTING CULTURES &
IDENTITIES 1, 8 (2015); see Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 947, 980 (D. Idaho
2020), appeal filed, No. 20-35815 (9th Cir. Sep. 17, 2020). “Transition” refers to
the process by which a transgender person harmonizes their gender expression
with their gender identity. GLAAD, supra note 1; Smith, supra note 1. The transition process is unique to each person and can include hormone therapy or surgery; however, not all trans individuals seek out or desire medical interventions.
Id.
149. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-1-52(b)(2) (2021) (stating that schools “may not allow a
biological female to participate on a male team if there is a female team in a
sport”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-310(a) (2021) (“A student’s gender for purposes
of participation in a public middle school or high school interscholastic athletic
activity or event must be determined by the student’s sex at the time of the student’s birth, as indicated on the student’s original birth certificate.”).
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yet gone through puberty.150 Further, the competition rationale is
completely irrelevant to intramural sports, yet many state-level laws
limit transgender girls’ and women’s participation anyway.151 Since
intramural sports do not generally have the primary goal of competition, preserving cisgender women’s competitive advantage does not
justify such a restriction.152
None of the state laws passed in the last two years include any
exceptions or accommodations for athletes who have undergone gender-affirming therapies. Such absolute restrictions stand in contrast
to policies embraced by the NCAA and the International Olympic
Committee, which both allow transgender women to compete if they
meet specific criteria.153 It is patently unreasonable to argue that an
intramural middle school sports team requires a more restrictive policy to ensure fair play than the Olympic Games, where the best athletes in the world compete.
Third, these laws put more onerous burdens on everyone participating in girls and women’s sports, including cisgender girls and women. This outcome occurs because anyone competing on a women’s
team might be forced to undergo invasive medical exams at their own
150. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 33-6203(b)(1) (2021) (excluding any student assigned
male at birth from participating in sports “designated for females, women, or
girls” beginning in elementary school); ALA. CODE § 16-1-52(b)(2) (2021) (“A public K-12 school may never allow a biological male to participate on a female
team.”); ARK. CODE § 16-130-103(1)(A) (2021) (defining a “covered entity” to include “[a]n elementary school”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-97-1 (2021) (barring all
students assigned male at birth from taking part in girls or women’s athletics
beginning in elementary school).
151. For example, the laws passed in Idaho, Arkansas, Florida, and West Virginia all
cover “[i]nterscholastic, intercollegiate, intramural, [and] club athletic teams or
sports.” See IDAHO CODE § 33-6203(1); ARK. CODE § 16-130-104; FLA. STAT.
§ 1006.205(3)(a) (2021); W. VA. CODE § 18-2-25d(c)(1). Mississippi’s law applies to
intramural and interscholastic sports only. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-97-1 (2021).
152. See Coleman & Hogshead-Makar, supra note 133 (criticizing state-level transgender sports bans for failing to account for “the multiple goals of sport at different levels of play and competition, which range from after school clubs to elite
regional events”).
153. Since 2011, the NCAA has allowed transgender women to compete in women’s
sports once they have completed “one calendar year” of treatment with testosterone-suppressing medication. NCAA OFF. INCLUSION, supra note 146, at 13. The
International Olympic Committee allows male-to-female transgender athletes to
compete in women’s events if they have had less than ten nanomoles per liter of
testosterone in serum for one year. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., IOC CONSENSUS MEETING ON SEX REASSIGNMENT AND HYPERANDROGENISM 2 (Nov. 2015), https://
13248aea-16f8-fc0a-cf26-a9339dd2a3f0.filesusr.com/ugd/
2bc3fc_c2d4035ff5684f41a813f6d04bc86e02.pdf [https://perma.cc/95SS-Y8C7].
The policy also requires trans women to maintain the aforementioned testosterone levels throughout their athletic career, and prohibits them from changing
their declared gender identity “for sporting purposes, for a minimum of four
years.” Id. at 2–3. An athlete failing to comply with the guidelines will be ineligible to compete in women’s events for twelve months. Id. at 3.
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expense to prove their sex assigned at birth.154 There is no corollary
burdening boys’ and men’s participation in sports.
Fourth, transgender women and girls make up a tiny percentage of
the population. Transgender individuals—including trans men, nonbinary individuals, and trans women—make up less than one percent
of those between the ages of thirteen and twenty-four in the United
States.155 Two important points follow from the size of the transgender population. Primarily, transgender women’s participation in
women’s sports does not pose a significant threat of categorically displacing cisgender women. Additionally, case-by-case, individualized
determinations regarding any potential safety or fairness concerns implicated by a transgender athlete’s participation would almost certainly not be overly burdensome or inefficient.
Finally, transgender women are women. They exist in the world as
women and deserve recognition as such. Depriving transgender women and girls of their constitutional rights is unquestionably damaging. Further, the harm inflicted on trans individuals’ emotional and
psychological well-being by their wholesale exclusion from women’s
sports far outweighs any hypothetical harm their presence may cause
cisgender women.156
3.

Bans on Transgender Girls and Women in Sports Would not
Survive Animus Review

Even if the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately finds that intermediate
scrutiny does not apply to discrimination based on transgender identity, these laws would still fail under animus review. The Supreme
Court’s 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans is instructive on this matter.
In Romer, the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited any governmental actions protect154. The Hecox majority emphasized this reality in holding that the cisgender plaintiff
had standing and that her Equal Protection claim was likely to succeed on the
merits. See Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 964–65, 987 (D. Idaho 2020),
appeal filed, No. 20-35815 (9th Cir. Sep 17, 2020). Idaho’s law includes a provision requiring any student whose sex assigned at birth is questioned to provide
documentation of their biological sex from a medical provider. IDAHO CODE § 33 6203(3). The medical provider must base their assessment on “the student’s reproductive anatomy, genetic makeup, or normal endogenously produced testosterone levels.” Id. Although the laws passed in other states do not include explicit
provisions for how gender disputes must be handled, it is very likely that state
agencies and school districts will implement similar requirements.
155. Jody Herman, et al., Age of Individuals who Identify as Transgender in the
United States, THE WILLIAMS INST. (2017), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/
wp-content/uploads/Age-Trans-Individuals-Jan-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHS5EUAB] (finding that 0.7% of thirteen- to twenty-four-year-olds in the U.S. are
transgender).
156. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text (discussing the relative harms to
transgender and cisgender women and girls).
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ing lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals within the state.157 The
amendment was promulgated in response to municipalities passing
ordinances that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.158 Colorado alleged that the primary interest behind the statute
was protecting its citizens’ constitutional right to freedom of association.159 It also argued that the amendment merely “den[ied] homosexuals special rights,” placing them “in the same position as all other
persons.”160
The Court held the amendment lacked a rational connection to any
valid governmental interest because its “sheer breadth [was] so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment
seem[ed] inexplicable by anything but animus toward” the lesbian,
gay, and bisexual communities.161 The Court also rejected the argument that the amendment merely put lesbian, gay, and bisexual residents in the same position as all other Coloradans, noting that it
withdrew “legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination”
from only that discrete minority group.162
As the law at issue in Romer, bans on transgender girls and women’s participation in women’s sports are “at once too narrow and too
broad.”163 They include transgender girls and women for whom the
proffered concerns about enhanced athletic performance based on testosterone levels are inapplicable. Further, they cover any athletic pursuit, even those with incredibly low stakes and primary goals other
than competition.164 On the other hand, the state laws rely on reductive and inaccurate conceptions of sex and entirely fail to account for
the existence of intersex persons.165 The laws also target a distinct
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 627.
See id. at 633.
See supra subsection II.C.2 for a more robust exploration of these arguments.
“Intersex” also functions as an umbrella term; it refers to “a variety of conditions
in which a person is born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t
seem to fit the typical definitions of female or male.” What is Intersex?, INTERSEX
SOC’Y OF N. AM., https://isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex/ [https://perma.cc/J6A6EQYS] (last visited Sept. 5, 2021). This can include physical characteristics and
genetic factors, such as a person born with some cells with XX chromosomes and
some with XY. Id. Although there is debate regarding the frequency with which
babies are born with intersex traits, a recent study found that approximately 1.3
in 1,000 infants were born with ambiguous genitalia. Banu Kucukemre Aydin et
al., Frequency of Ambiguous Genitalia in 14,177 Newborns in Turkey, 3 J. ENDOCRINE SOC’Y 1185, 1186 (2019). Earlier studies estimated that roughly one in
4,500 to 5,500 babies had ambiguous genitalia at birth. Id. (citing Peter A. Lee et
al., Global Disorders of Sex Development Update Since 2006: Perceptions, Approach and Care, 85 HORM RES PAEDIATR 158, 158 (2016)).
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and historically marginalized community and treat them differently
than other groups.166
Thus, as in Romer, the fit between states’ proffered motivation for
these laws and the means they chose to effectuate that purpose is so
poor that the only possible explanation is a pretext. And, as the Supreme Court has stated, if the Equal Protection Clause’s promise
“means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”167 Regardless of the degree of scrutiny ultimately applied, state-level anti-transgender sports bans cannot withstand review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
B.

Fulfilling Title IX’s Promise

Title IX states that no one “shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”168 Examining the statute’s plain language
using the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bostock, it is clear that
discrimination based on gender identity by definition relies upon and
implicates discrimination “on the basis of sex.”169 Further, including
transgender youth fully in all relevant educational programming and
activities—including sports—is aligned with Title IX’s purpose of ensuring that young people facing exclusion and marginalization based
on gender have the same opportunities to thrive as everyone else.
1.

Applying Title IX’s Plain Language

The plain language of Title IX prevents discrimination “on the basis of sex.”170 The original public meaning of the term “sex” when Title
IX was enacted in 1972 was almost certainly the categorical designation “male or female” based on physiological differences.171 Further,
“on the basis of”—like “because of” under Title VII—incorporates but166. As the Court stated in Romer, the idea that such laws merely decline to give the
targeted group “special rights” is an “implausible” reading of their provisions. See
Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
167. Id. at 634 (quotation omitted) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
168. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 54–62.
170. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
171. See, e.g., Sex, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1966); Sex,
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1969). This is consistent with what the
Bostock majority found “sex” meant in 1964 when Title VII was enacted—“biological distinctions between male and female.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct.
1731, 1739 (2020).
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for causation.172 Therefore, Title IX would apply where multiple factors contributed to differential treatment, so long as it would not have
occurred except for the person’s sex. Finally, like Title VII, Title IX
focuses on discrimination against individuals.173 Title IX provides
that “[n]o person” is to “be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination” based on sex.174 This
emphasis on discrimination against individuals means that a school
cannot avoid liability based on how it treats women overall.175
Thus, an analog of the “straightforward rule” established by the
Bostock majority applies here: a federally-funded educational institution violates Title IX when it intentionally excludes or discriminates
against a person “based in part on sex.”176 Under this rule, it is impossible to exclude a transgender girl from educational activities and programs because she is transgender without basing that decision, at
least in part, on her sex assigned at birth.
In the realm of sex-segregated sports, excluding a transgender girl
because of her sex assigned at birth would still amount to a violation
of Title IX, notwithstanding the regulatory exceptions to the strict
non-discrimination rule for athletics.177 Subsection (a) of the Athletic
Regulations states that no one may be excluded, discriminated
against, or “treated differently from another person” in athletic opportunities offered by federally-funded schools because of that person’s
sex.178 Additionally, the regulations plainly state that covered schools
may not create separate sports programs on the basis of sex, except
“where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the
activity involved is a contact sport.”179 But even then, schools must
allow a person to try out if it only sponsors a team for the other sex,
and opportunities for members of the excluded “sex have previously
been limited.”180
Here, excluding a transgender girl because of her sex assigned at
birth is treating her “differently from another person” based on sex.181
172. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570
U.S. 338, 346 (2013)).
173. See supra subsection II.C.2 for a discussion on the similarities between Title VII
and Title IX, including both statutory schemes’ focus on discrimination against
individuals.
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
175. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
176. See id. (“An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual
employee based in part on sex.”).
177. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41.
178. Id. § 106.41(a).
179. See Id. § 106.41(a)–(b). (defining contact sports: “boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice
hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of
which involves bodily contact.” Id. § 106.41(b)).
180. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
181. Id. § 106.41(a).
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Like the language used in the statutory scheme, the language “on the
basis of” indicates but-for causation.182 Therefore, even if her sex assigned at birth is not the only reason she is treated differently, the
regulation would still apply so long as she would not have been excluded but for her sex assigned at birth.
Further, throughout subsections (a) and (b), the regulations use
the terms “each sex,” “one sex,” and “the other sex,” whereas subsection (c) refers to ensuring parity between “male and female teams”
generally.183 A commonly used canon of statutory interpretation instructs that different language indicates different meanings.184 Thus,
the promulgating agency’s decisions to refer to the “sex” of individual
student-athletes to prohibit discrimination and employ “male and female” when referring to ensuring institution-wide gender parity is significant. This distinction implies that more flexible and individualized
determination might be made for single athletes, whereas the broad
categories of men and women, and the norm of general equity between
them, is to remain fixed.
2.

Title IX’s Object and Purpose

Contrary to assertions made by opponents of transgender inclusion
in athletics,185 Title IX’s object and purpose also militate toward an
inclusive approach. Congress enacted Title IX “to secure equality for
women and girls in federally-funded educational settings.”186 Early
opponents of Title IX voiced concerns about its possible negative impact on the resources and opportunities provided to young men.187
However, Congress ultimately determined that such concerns were
less consequential than preventing federally-funded schools from discriminating against girls and women.188 Congress came to this decision partly because federally-funded schools had excluded and
marginalized young women as a group while providing young men
182. See supra notes 56, 59.
183. Id. § 106.41(a)–(c).
184. See Anuj C. Desai, The Dilemma of Interstatutory Interpretation, 77 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 177, 236 (2020) (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW 109
(2016)) (referring to the canon of meaningful variation as “a staple of the textualist toolbox”).
185. See supra notes 132–33. Notably, in Soule, the plaintiffs’ primary argument was
that permitting transgender women to compete in girls track and field violated
Title IX by injuring cisgender women’s equal opportunities to compete. See Soule
by Stanescu v. Conn. Ass’n of Schs., Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00201, 2021 WL 1617206, at
*1 (D. Conn. Apr. 25, 2021).
186. Coleman et al., supra note 12, at 76.
187. See subsection II.A.2 for an in-depth discussion of early opposition and challenges to Title IX, particularly its application to athletics.
188. See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.
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with relatively unfettered opportunities.189 Therefore, the possibility
that Title IX may cause a slight decrease in the breadth of resources
schools extended to young men, although not ideal, was preferable to
schools continuing to treat young women like second-class citizens.
Cisgender and transgender women are both historically marginalized groups, but transgender women face more severe discrimination
in all sectors of society, including education.190 Schools extending athletic opportunities to transgender student-athletes would substantially positively impact trans students’ well-being. The profound
effects of discrimination against transgender youth are well-documented and nearly undisputed.191 Approximately eighty-five percent
of transgender teenagers in the U.S. admitted to “seriously considering suicide,” and over half had already attempted suicide.192 Experiencing discrimination and stigma in educational settings is
associated with an increased risk of suicidal ideations and suicide attempts.193 Other studies have found that seventy-seven percent of
189. See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. Additionally, the plain language
of the Athletic Regulations, which have been upheld by Congress and against
multiple court challenges, explicitly ground Title IX’s remedial scheme on addressing young women’s past marginalization relative to young men. See 34
C.F.R. § 106.41(b); Clark by & through Clark v. Ariz. Interschol. Ass’n, 695 F.2d
1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]here is clearly a substantial relationship between the exclusion of males from the team and the goal of redressing past discrimination and providing equal opportunities for women.”).
190. See Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 947, 977 (D. Idaho 2020), appeal filed,
No. 20-35815 (9th Cir. Sep 17, 2020); JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY
TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011).
191. See, e.g., Michelle M. Johns et al., Transgender Identity and Experiences of Violence Victimization, Substance Use, Suicide Risk, and Sexual Risk Behaviors
Among High School Students—19 States and Large Urban School Districts, 2017,
68 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 67, 71 (2019) (finding that transgender
high school students “appear to face serious risk for violence victimization, substance use, and suicide” and recommending “creat[ing] safe learning environments and provid[ing] access to culturally competent physical and mental health
care” to help improve transgender students’ overall health); Eric C. Wilson et al.,
The Impact of Discrimination on the Mental Health of Trans*Female Youth and
the Protective Effect of Parental Support, 20 AIDS BEHAV. 2203, 2204 (2016)
(“Discrimination has been linked to poor mental health outcomes among adult
transgender people. Prevalence of suicide attempts in the transgender population
range from 18–41%, which is 15–38 percentage points higher than in the overall
U.S. population.”)
192. Study: Transgender Teens’ Suicide Risk Higher Than Cisgender Peers’, UNIV.
PITTSBURGH (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.pitt.edu/pittwire/features-articles/
study-transgender-teens-suicide-risk-higher-cisgender-peers [https://perma.cc/
ETN8-GZXN].
193. Jody L. Herman & Kathryn K. O’Neill, Suicide Risk and Prevention for Transgender People: Summary of Research Findings WILLIAMS INST., 1 (2021), https://
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Trans-Suicide-Summary-Sep2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERJ9-FA3Y].
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transgender K–12 students whose transgender status was “known or
perceived” had been harassed by other students and even by teachers
and staff.194 Such harassment has substantial and long-lasting adverse effects on transgender students’ academic performance and psychological well-being.195
Conversely, when society affirms trans students’ gender identities,
their mental health outcomes improve significantly.196 Social support
and inclusive school policies can lower the risk of suicide among transgender youth and increase their sense of safety at school.197 Participating in school sports, in particular, has “many positive effects on
physical, social, and emotional well-being.”198 Transgender studentathletes reported earning higher grades than transgender students
who did not play sports.199
Transgender girls and women competing in sex-segregating sports
in a manner consistent with their gender identity may result in minor
disadvantages for some cisgender student-athletes but there is no demonstrative evidence that transgender women have a decisive and
consistent athletic advantage over cisgender women.200 The pervasive
discrimination that transgender youth experience have difinitive, severe repercussions on their health and well-being.201 Thus, allowing
transgender girls and women to participate in girls’ and women’s
sports poses a potential minor disadvantage to cisgender student-athletes while standing to have a substantial positive impact on the wellbeing of transgender students.
194. SANDY JAMES ET AL., REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY, NAT’L CTR.
FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 11 (2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/
docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA7Y-NRQV]. Notably,
the majority in Grimm cited this report in support of extending protection to
transgender students. See Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 597
(4th Cir. 2020), as amended (Aug. 28, 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-1163, 2021 WL
2637992 (U.S. 2021).
195. JAMES ET AL., supra note 194, at 11; see JOSEPH G. KOSCIW ET AL., GLSEN, 2017
NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 14–16 (2018).
196. Grimm, 972 F.3d at 597.
197. See Shoshana K Gold Berg & Thee Santos, Fact Sheet: The Importance of Sports
Participation for Transgender Youth, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 18, 2021,
1:14 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbtq-rights/reports/2021/03/
18/497336/fact-sheet-importance-sports-participation-transgender-youth/ [https:/
/perma.cc/WJ68-HLDH]; HERMAN & O’NEILL, supra note 193, at 2.
198. NCAA OFF. OF INCLUSION, supra note 146, at 8.
199. THE TREVOR PROJECT, RESEARCH BRIEF: THE WELL-BEING OF LGBTQ YOUTH ATHLETES 1 (2020), https://www.thetrevorproject.org/survey-2020/ [https://perma.cc/
CUS6-ZMW9] (reporting that twenty-seven percent of transgender teens who
played sports reported receiving mostly A’s, compared with only nineteen percent
of transgender youth who did not play sports).
200. See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 192–200 and accompanying text.
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This result is consistent with the spirit of Title IX. The statute and
pertinent regulations seek to protect individuals from exclusion and
discrimination based on gender while consciously accepting that, at
times, doing so may reduce some opportunities offered to members of a
relatively more privileged class. Thus, Title IX’s object and purpose
admonish federally funded schools not to deny benefits or opportunities to transgender girls and women based on sex, including the opportunity to compete with their peers in women’s sports.
IV.

CONCLUSION

To echo the majority in Grimm, “[t]he proudest moments of the federal judiciary have been when we affirm the burgeoning values of our
bright youth, rather than preserve the prejudices of the past.”202 In so
stating, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals referenced the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and
Obergefell v. Hodges.203 As with the substantive rights these
landmark decisions recognized, changing existing understandings and
practices surrounding transgender inclusion in school sports will
likely be complex and involve inevitable trade-offs. However, it too is
the correct decision to make, both based on the applicable law and
broad concepts of equity and fair play.

202. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 620 (4th Cir. 2020), as
amended (Aug. 28, 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-1163, 2021 WL 2637992 (U.S.
2021).
203. Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); and then citing Obergefell
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)).

